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Abstract 
Social primes (pro-social, anti-social) can modulate mimicry behaviour. To date, these 
social modulation effects have been explained by the primed incentive to affiliate with 
another (Social Top-Down Response Modulation; STORM) and the primed active-self-
concept leading to behaviour that is either consistent or inconsistent with the prime-construct 
(Active-Self account). The present study was designed to explore the explanatory power for 
each of these accounts, and thereby gain a greater understanding of how social modulation 
unfolds. To do this, we assessed social modulation of motor contagion in individuals high or 
low in self-monitoring. It was reasoned that high self-monitors would modulate mimicry 
according to the primed social incentive, whereas low self-monitors would modulate 
according to the primed active-self-concept. Participants were primed with a pro-social and 
anti-social cue in the first-person and third-person perspective. Next, they completed an 
interpersonal observation-execution task featuring the simultaneous observation and 
execution of arm movements that were either congruent or incongruent to each other. Results 
showed increased incongruent movement deviation (motor contagion) for the anti-social 
compared to the pro-social prime in the high self-monitors only. Findings support the 
STORM account of mimicry by showing observers modulate behaviour based on the social 
incentive underpinning an interpersonal exchange. 
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Introduction 
Observing an action can influence the physical execution of that same action 
(Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz,, 2000; 
Castiello, 2003; Dijkerman & Smit, 2007; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Mattar & 
Gribble, 2005; Welsh et al., 2005). For example, when primed to execute a finger/grasp 
response via a numeric cue (Brass et al., 2000; Liepelt, von Cramon, & Brass, 2008) or 
change in stimulus configuration (Cook, Press, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2010; Press, Bird, Flach, 
& Heyes, 2005; Press, Gillmeister, & Heyes, 2007), participants respond faster when an 
observed action is congruent, as opposed to incongruent, with their own response action. The 
differences in response times have been associated with lower-level sensorimotor processes 
that underlie imitation and mimicry. The notion is that an observer maps an observed action 
onto a corresponding sensorimotor response code (i.e., visuomotor priming), which facilitates 
the execution of the same action, or interferes with the execution of an alternative action 
(Blakemore & Frith, 2005; Heyes, 2010; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; 
Prinz, 1997; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). 
Mimicry behaviour associated with the difference between observed congruent and 
incongruent action stimuli can be modulated by priming observers with pro- or anti-social 
attitudes (Leighton, Bird, Orsini, & Heyes, 2010). Using a scrambled sentence task, Leighton 
et al. (2010) showed pro-social primes (e.g., ‘She is my friend’) increased mimicry compared 
to anti-social primes (e.g., ‘They are our enemy’). In addition, the involuntary mimicry of 
actions during a naturalistic interpersonal exchange increased following a pro-social 
compared to an anti-social prime (van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, de Bouter, & van 
Knippenberg, 2003). The influence of social processes on the coupling between perception 
and action during mimicry may be explained by the Social Top-down Response Modulation 
(STORM) account (Wang & Hamilton, 2012), which suggests that observers activate a 
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strategic incentive to facilitate social interactions with other agents, thus leading to positive 
social affect. More specifically, a social prime may activate a goal to affiliate with another 
individual, such that the observer involuntarily adopts mimicry in order to achieve this social 
goal. In this instance, mimicry is adopted because observers enhance their chances of being 
liked or favoured by the individual being mimicked (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). 
Because the STORM account suggests that mimicry is contingent upon an observer’s 
goal to affiliate, mimicry behaviour is modulated according to the context in which an 
interpersonal exchange unfolds. For example, the initial failure to affiliate with another 
individual (Lakin Chartrand, 2003), or when becoming excluded from group-based tasks 
(Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Over & Carpenter, 2009), can increase involuntary 
mimicry. Moreover, when presented with an anti-social compared to a pro-social prime, 
observers produced increased mimicry effects when interacting with a human model stimulus 
(Roberts, Bennett, & Hayes, 2016). In these anti-social instances, it was suggested that prior 
to an interpersonal exchange, an observer may have already established a specific goal to 
affiliate with another individual (see Miles, Nind, Henderson, & Macrae, 2010). Thus, in the 
event there is a perceived threat to obtaining this goal during the interpersonal exchange (e.g., 
anti-social context), an observer may enhance mimicry in order to accommodate for such a 
loss. In this regard, mimicry is adopted in an attempt to achieve positive social affect within 
the individual being mimicked, although when initially threatened the mimicry may be more 
accurately described as a process of restoring social harmony. 
Using a similar stimulus-response procedure as Leighton et al. (2010), Wang and 
Hamilton (2013) concluded in favour of an alternative Active-Self account to explain the 
social modulation of behavioural mimicry. Mimicry was found to increase following pro-
social primes compared to anti-social primes when self-related pronouns were also presented 
(e.g., ‘I’, ‘we’), whereas mimicry was greater following anti-social primes compared to pro-
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social primes (Experiment 2) when third-person nouns were presented (e.g., ‘Joe’, ‘Greg’). 
These findings were suggested to manifest from a role of the active-self-concept, which refers 
to a transient and readily accessible form of the ‘self’, and is a subset of the chronic self-
concept, which refers to an invariant and long-term representation of the ‘self’ (Wheeler, 
DeMarree, & Petty, 2007). The influence of primes on behaviour can be determined by 
whether the prime-construct assimilates or contrasts with the active-self-concept. That is, 
while primes make certain social information accessible, it is how the information is 
processed by an observer in relation to the ‘self’ that modulates the direction of mimicry. 
With regards to the findings of Wang and Hamilton (2013), the impact of social primes on 
mimicry was contingent upon whether the primes assimilated with the pro-social self-concept 
during first-person presentation, or contrasted during the third-person presentation. To 
elucidate, the pro-social prime from the first-person perspective may have assimilated with 
the pro-social self-concept, which then elicited mimicry behaviour consistent with the 
primed-construct (pro-social). When the pro-social prime was taken from the third-person 
perspective, it did not contrast with the pro-social self-concept, and thus generated less 
mimicry. For the anti-social prime that was taken from the first-person perspective, there was 
no assimilation with the pro-social self-concept, which limited mimicry. However, when the 
anti-social prime was taken from the third-person perspective, it likely contrasted with the 
pro-social self-concept, which then generated prosocial mimicry as a form of behaviour that 
was inconsistent with primed-construct (anti-social). 
Because of the proposed role of the active-self-concept, it is reasonable to consider 
whether the social modulation of mimicry is influenced by individual differences in 
perceiving and implementing self-related information. Indeed, a characteristic feature of the 
‘self’ is self-monitoring, which refers to a process of monitoring and adapting one’s 
behaviour in accordance with the situational context (Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 
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1986). High self-monitors demonstrate increased sensitivity to situational cues and are more 
adept at changing their own behaviour to fit into social environments (i.e., persons of 
impression).1 Low-self-monitors demonstrate increased sensitivity to dispositional cues such 
that behaviour is more consistent with their own feelings and beliefs (i.e., persons of 
expression). 
To date, evidence suggests there is a greater tendency to mimic one’s peers (e.g., 
fellow undergraduate student) compared to non-peers (e.g., high school student) in high self-
monitors, but not in low self-monitors (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003). Moreover, there is a 
positive relationship between self-monitoring scores (higher scores indicating high self-
monitoring) and the mimicry of facial expressions that generate positive social affect (i.e., 
laughing), but not for expressions generating negative social affect (i.e., frowning) (Estow, 
Jamieson, & Yates, 2007). Consistent with the STORM account, these findings suggest that 
high self-monitors more readily interpret social primes as situational cues, which leads to 
greater social modulation compared to low self-monitors. Therefore, social modulation of 
mimicry behaviour can unfold because an observer seeks to create an impression. 
Alternatively, when priming individuals to a number ‘7’ (priming feeling of lucky), 
compared to number ‘13’ (priming feeling of unlucky), there is a greater tendency to interpret 
non-word masks as lucky-related words in low self-monitors, but not in high self-monitors 
(Experiment 2; DeMarree, Wheeler, & Petty, 2005). This finding suggests that low self-
monitors more closely reflect their own feelings, and the associated primed-construct, 
compared to high self-monitors (Wheeler et al., 2007). Thus, based on the Active-Self 
account, it could be that low self-monitors perceive social primes as dispositional cues, which 
leads to increased social modulation compared to high self-monitors. In this regard, the social 
modulation of mimicry behaviour unfolds as a form of expression. 
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To date, both the STORM and Active-Self accounts have contributed to our 
understanding social modulation of mimicry behaviour. Thus, the aim of the present study is 
to further examine these theoretical accounts by exploring the influence of self-monitoring, 
which predicts different outcomes for each of these respective accounts. In our previous work 
on social modulation (Roberts, Bennett et al., 2016), observers executed horizontal arm 
movements while concurrently observing a congruent horizontal, or an incongruent 
curvilinear, human arm movement. Social context was primed using pro-social or anti-social 
words. Similar to the results of Wang and Hamilton (2013), we showed greater motor 
contagion (as indicated by greater orthogonal movement deviation for incongruent compared 
to congruent stimuli), and therefore mimicry, following anti-social compared to pro-social 
primes (N.B., without manipulating person-perspective). To extend this work, we used a 
similar interpersonal protocol to examine mimicry in high and low self-monitors (Snyder & 
Gangestad, 1986) when primed with anti-social and pro-social primes from a first or third-
person perspective.  
Figure 1 illustrates the hypotheses and predicted behavioural outcomes associated 
with STORM and Active-Self accounts of social modulation. Firstly, it is predicted that there 
will be greater deviation away from the intended direction of movement and toward the 
orthogonal axis during the observation of incongruent compared to congruent movement 
stimuli (i.e., motor contagion or mimicry effect), irrespective of social information (see 
Kilner et al., 2003; Roberts, Hayes, Uji, & Bennett, 2015). In accord with the STORM 
account, we predict there to be increase in motor contagion following an anti-social compared 
to pro-social prime (i.e., social modulation effect) (Roberts, Bennett et al., 2016), which will 
be greater in high self-monitors compared to low self-monitors. Because the STORM account 
does not specify how self-related information influences social modulation, it could be 
expected that there will be no significant change in the social modulation effects (pro-social 
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vs. anti-social) when first- or third-person perspective primes are presented. Alternatively, 
based on the Active-Self account, we predict that there will be increased motor contagion 
following a pro-social compared to an anti-social prime in the first-person perspective (Wang 
& Hamilton, 2013), and increased contagion following an anti-social compared to the pro-
social prime in the third-person perspective, with these effects being greater in low self-
monitors compared to high self-monitors. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Method 
Participants 
Data was recorded from thirty-eight participants (age range of 18-21 years), although 
one participant was removed due to recording errors (high self-monitoring n=19, low self-
monitoring n=18). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written 
informed consent prior to participation. The experiment was designed in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the local ethics committee of the host university. 
 
Apparatus and Materials 
The stimulus display was back-projected (Hitachi CP-X345) on a flat white screen 
(2.74 x 3.66 m) at a viewing distance of 1.9 m. Pre-recorded video-clips were edited using 
Adobe Premier CS5 software, and later presented using the COGENT toolbox implemented 
in MATLAB (Mathworks, Inc). Movements were recorded at 200Hz from an infrared sensor 
positioned on the tip of the right index finger using a 3D Investigator Motion Capture system 
(Northern Digital Inc., Ontario, Canada). The first and last 5 s of data recordings were 
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discarded to minimize asynchrony around movement onset, and the potential influence of 
attentional and fatigue effects (see Hardwick & Edwards, 2012; Roberts, Hayes et al., 2015). 
A scrambled-sentence task was used to prime a social attitude and consisted of an A4 
four-page booklet with six partially formed sentences on each page. Self-monitoring was 
measured using the 18-item self-monitoring scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). Participants 
responded to each item with true (‘T’) or false (‘F’). Before calculating the sum of the scores 
for each participant, ten items were reverse-scored, with high scores indicating high self-
monitoring, and low scores indicating low-self-monitoring. The groups were differentiated by 
a median split of the self-monitoring scores (e.g., Cheng & Chartrand, 2003). 
 
Stimuli 
The visual stimuli consisted of a human model that moved the right arm cyclically 
across the mid-line of the body with a horizontal, or curvilinear, trajectory for 30 s. The 
model stimuli were scaled so participants approximated a 400 mm horizontal displacement 
for each individual movement segment (i.e., left-to-right, right-to-left). While the horizontal 
stimuli followed a relatively straight horizontal movement trajectory, the curvilinear stimuli 
featured predominant horizontal amplitude with an added vertical component, which peaked 
at around the midsagittal axis. Thus, the curvilinear movement end-points aligned with those 
of the horizontal stimuli, but the movement trajectory was different (see Roberts, Hayes et al., 
2015; Sparks, Douglas, & Kritikos, 2016). There were two model stimuli for each of the 
horizontal and curvilinear trajectories. The movements were well practised by the models so 
that the required movement amplitude and segment frequency of 1 Hz was accurate and 
consistent. Finally, the control condition consisted of a static display of the human model 
with a red fixation dot positioned at screen centre. The control condition was designed to 
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ensure there was no attention or muscular fatigue effects from performing continuous 
horizontal arm movements across trials. 
 
Task and Procedure 
Upon entering the lab, participants performed two tasks: a scrambled-sentence task 
and motor task. For the scrambled-sentence task, participants were instructed that the task 
was designed to assess how colour influences language proficiency (Leighton et al., 2010). In 
this task, participants had to carefully combine a selection of five different coloured words 
with already selected words to form a comprehensive sentence (adapted from Wang & 
Hamilton, 2013) (see Figure 2). When accurately formed, the sentences reflected pro-social 
(e.g., ‘help’) or anti-social (e.g., ‘fight’) behaviours in a first- (e.g., ‘I’) or third-person (i.e., 
‘Chris’) perspective. To check the sentences were accurate, and to ensure participants 
acknowledged the prime-constructs, they read the sentence aloud. The motor task involved 
participants executing cyclical horizontal arm movements across the mid-line of the body. 
Prior to the test phase, participants practised (x 2 trials) performing the required arm 
movements by executing horizontal movements between two static targets positioned on the 
left and right side of the screen and in-time with a 1 Hz auditory metronome (i.e., one arm 
movement segment per auditory tone; 2 Hz movement cycles). The target dots and auditory 
metronome were then removed prior to the test phase. Participants would execute the same 
arm movements whilst fixating on a stationary dot (control), or in-time with a horizontal or 
curvilinear movement stimulus (experimental conditions). 
During the experimental conditions, participants completed one sentence on the 
scrambled-sentence task before executing a trial of the motor task. There were six trials for 
each of the movement stimuli per block, with each block primed by a pro-social or anti-social 
context from the first-person or third-person perspective. The block order was counter-
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balanced across participants. Within each block of trials, the model stimuli were pseudo-
randomly presented with the caveat that no stimulus could be presented on more than two 
consecutive trials. For a single participant, the pro-social prime-construct was assigned to one 
model and the anti-social was assigned to the other (e.g., pro-social for ‘Model A’, anti-social 
for ‘Model B’). The assignment of model stimuli to prime-constructs was counter-balanced 
across participants. Finally, the control trials were presented at the start and end of the trial 
order in order to assess the potential of attention and muscular fatigue effects. Following the 
observation-execution task, participants completed the 18-item self-monitoring questionnaire 
(Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). The delivery of the questionnaire toward the end of the 
experiment ensured participants did not raise any suspicions surrounding the overall purposes 
of the experiment, nor bias their response during the motor task. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Data reduction and analysis 
Arm position data were low-pass filtered at 10 Hz using an autoregressive filter 
implemented in MATLAB. Individual movement segments were determined by identifying 
the reversal points of the primary movement axis (i.e., x-axis; horizontal). Standard deviation 
of the fingertip position within the orthogonal movement axis was extracted (i.e., y-axis; 
vertical) for each movement segment. Average deviation was calculated across movement 
segments of individual trials. 
For the statistical analysis, we first performed a comparison (using Mann-Whitney U 
test due to unequal variance of the groups) between the ratings of self-monitoring in the high 
and low groups to ensure proper distinction for the category of self-monitoring (i.e., high > 
low). We then conducted a 2 self-monitoring (high self-monitors, low self-monitors) x 2 trial 
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number (start, end) mixed-design ANOVA on average deviation data of control trials in order 
to determine any attention and muscular fatigue effects. For experimental trial data, we 
conducted a 2 self-monitoring (high self-monitors, low self-monitors) x 2 stimuli (horizontal, 
curvilinear) x 2 prime (pro-social, anti-social) x 2 perspective (first-person, third-person) 
mixed-design ANOVA on average deviation with self-monitoring being the only between-
measures factor. Significant effects featuring more than two means were decomposed using 
Tukey HSD post hoc procedure, and significant effects were declared at p < .05. 
 
Results 
The experimental control checks indicated that while participants were able to 
acknowledge the social component of the first- and third-person sentences, they were unable 
to infer any influence toward the interpersonal observation-execution task. They also believed 
that the instructions issued by the experimenter in the scrambled-sentence task were a test of 
language proficiency, and the interpersonal observation-execution task was a measure of 
motor control (Wang & Hamilton, 2013). The comparison between self-monitoring scores for 
the high and low groups indicated an appropriate characteristic split of the data (Ws = 171.00, 
z = -5.22, p < .05), with the high group (mdn = 11) reporting a significantly greater self-
monitoring score than the low group (mdn = 6). 
 
Movement deviation 
The comparison of control trials revealed no significant main effect of self-monitoring 
F(1, 35) = .58, p > .05, partial 2 = .02, or a self-monitoring by trial number interaction, F(1, 
35) = .43, p > .05, partial 2 = .01. There was a significant main effect of trial number, F(1, 
35) = 7.02, p < .05, partial 2 = .17, indicating a decrease in movement deviation across trials. 
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Therefore, any subsequent increase in deviation during the experimental trials would be 
specific to the stimulus conditions, rather than fatigue. 
For the experimental trials, there was a significant main effect of stimuli, F(1, 35) = 
23.92, p < 0.05, partial 2 = .41, indicating greater deviation for the observation of 
incongruent stimuli compared to congruent stimuli. There was also a significant two-way 
interaction between stimuli and prime, F(1, 35) = 4.94, p < .05, partial 2 = .12, and a three-
way interaction between self-monitoring, stimuli and prime, F(1, 35) = 5.06, p < .05, partial 
2 = .13. As illustrated in Figure 3, there was less deviation for the incongruent stimulus 
when primed by the pro-social compared to the anti-social cues in the high self-monitoring 
group, but not the low self-monitoring group. There were no significant differences for the 
congruent stimulus across pro-social and anti-social cues in each of the self-monitoring 
groups. Finally, there was no significant main effect, nor an interaction featuring the factor of 
perspective (ps > .05). 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Discussion 
Extending upon previous work that showed mimicry is modulated by social primes 
(Cook & Bird, 2011; Leighton et al., 2010; Wang & Hamilton, 2013), the present study 
additionally examined the influence of self-monitoring during an interpersonal observation-
execution task (Roberts, Bennett et al., 2016). Participants were primed by a pro-social or 
anti-social cue, presented in the first- or third-person perspective, prior to executing cyclical 
horizontal arm movements during the observation of congruent horizontal or incongruent 
curvilinear arm movements. In addition, participants were categorized as high or low in self-
monitoring. Results showed greater involuntary movement deviation when observing the 
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incongruent stimulus following an anti-social prime compared to a pro-social prime, and that 
these effects were primarily found in the high compared to low self-monitors. 
The social modulation effect shown in the current study is inconsistent with evidence 
showing greater mimicry following a pro-social compared to the anti-social prime (e.g., Cook 
& Bird, 2012; Leighton et al., 2010). However, they are in accord with the predictions of the 
STORM model (Wang & Hamilton, 2012), which suggests modulation effects courtesy of 
social primes are underpinned by the observer’s interpretation of the social context. For 
example, anti-social primes can cause greater mimicry than pro-social primes in situations 
where the observer initially seeks affiliation (Roberts, Bennett et al., 2016). Thus, in a 
situation of perceiving an anti-social prime, an observer may increase their mimicry because 
it typically elicits positive social affect in the observed agent, while compensating for any 
initial deterioration in the social exchange (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Over & 
Carpenter, 2009). On the other hand, pro-social primes may produce greater mimicry than 
anti-social primes during situations of limited social context because the primes can begin to 
initiate a strategic incentive to affiliate. Taken together, the overriding incentive to 
accumulate affiliation, along with the subsequent use of mimicry in order to achieve this 
incentive, may represent the most common feature of all the empirical cases (e.g., Leighton et 
al., 2010; Roberts, Bennett et al., 2016) that lend support to the STORM account. 
The above interpretation is supported by the fact that only high self-monitors 
demonstrated social modulation. High self-monitors are defined by their increased sensitivity 
and/or ability to detect and use situational cues to modulate subsequent behaviour. 
Consequently, high self-monitors may be described as persons of impression. Thus, the social 
primes presented in the current study seemed to be more readily accessible to high self-
monitors who used this information to modulate mimicry in order to convey a certain 
impression of themselves. In the context of the STORM model, it may be that the increased 
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motor contagion following an anti-social compared to pro-social prime in high self-monitors, 
and not low self-monitors, resulted from an initial interpretation of an anti-social context, 
which renders a potential threat to achieving affiliation. As a result, high self-monitors 
showed greater mimicry because it is typically a process that can advance social outcomes 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), while potentially overcoming any perceived disadvantages 
toward reaching social goals. This conjecture is consistent with evidence that shows high 
self-monitors mimic those they have a greater desire to affiliate with (e.g., fellow students) 
(Cheng & Chartrand, 2003), and when the action to-be-mimicked pertains to a positive social 
affect (e.g., laughing) (Estow et al., 2007). 
Of interest, the greater social modulation effect in high self-monitors was underpinned 
by a down-regulation of motor contagion (inhibition) following a pro-social prime rather than 
an up-regulation (facilitation) following an anti-social prime. The direction of this effect is 
consistent with high self-monitors mimicking less than low self-monitors when primed to a 
position of power (i.e., leader), where there may be a reduced social incentive (Cheng & 
Chartrand, 2003). Moreover, high self-monitors decrease mimicry after they have 
experienced a successful interaction with the incentive to affiliate compared to having no 
incentive to affiliate (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). Therefore, high self-monitors are just as 
likely to reduce mimicry in order to respond to situations where they do not need to generate 
pro-social behaviour, as well as situations where mimicry may be more strongly needed to 
achieve social gains. Alternatively, low self-monitors seem to mimic observed actions 
regardless of the situation or context. Therefore, why did high self-monitors find themselves 
inhibiting motor contagion following pro-social primes? 
To address this, we consider the influence that mimicry has on the observed agent 
(person being mimicked) during interpersonal settings. Generally speaking, being mimicked 
increases the sense of liking and/or affiliation (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999, see Chartrand & 
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Lakin, 2013). However, mimicry is modulated by the specific context in which it unfolds. 
That is, mimicry beholds particular standards or expectancies surrounding the magnitude and 
frequency of its occurrence. For example, mimicry elicits colder feelings (i.e., the “chills”; 
indicator of negative social affect) when initially greeted with a formal affiliative demeanour 
compared to an informal non-affiliative demeanour (Experiment 1; Leander, Chartrand, & 
Bargh, 2012). In addition, mimicry causes colder feelings in independent individuals that are 
predisposed to greater social anxiety and avoidance, compared to interdependent individuals 
(Experiment 3; Leander et al., 2012). Thus, it appears that when the implicit standards of 
mimicry are contrasted (e.g., too much/too little mimicry), an adverse social affect manifests 
within the observer. In the context of the present study, the instruction to move in synchrony 
with the observed model may have generated an initial incentive to affiliate with the model. 
As a result, the pro-social prime may have heightened the social engagement, and therefore 
contrasted with the observer’s implicit standards. That is, the observer may be cautious not to 
violate the expectations surrounding an unfamiliar interpersonal exchange, where too much 
mimicry may be misconstrued as suspicious (Leander et al., 2012). Presumably, high self-
monitors would have prevented this from happening by attempting to decrease the amount of 
contagion (or mimicry). Notably, this pattern of modulation is consistent with the STORM 
account, which suggests the control of mimicry is contingent upon the perceived social 
context and individual incentive to affiliate. Therefore, high self-monitors may have been 
more sensitive to the perceived social context (e.g., social prime word), and thus able to 
modulate their motor contagion so not to diminish the social gains by producing too much 
(pro-social context) or too little (anti-social context) mimicry. 
The alternative Active-Self account suggests that social modulation is related to how 
the perceived social primes either assimilate or contrast with the active-self-concept (Wang & 
Hamilton, 2013). Based on this particular account, it was predicted that the prime to person-
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perspective (1st, 3rd) should influence the direction of social modulation with pro-social 
primes generating greater contagion than anti-social primes when taken from the first-person 
perspective (assimilation), and anti-social primes generating greater mimicry than pro-social 
primes when taken from the third-person perspective (contrast). However, the current 
findings indicate that there was no influence of person-perspective suggesting social 
modulation in our task occurs independent of the perspective in which the social prime was 
presented. In reconciling the reported effects of person-perspective for the current and 
previous studies (i.e., Wang & Hamilton, 2013), it is important to consider the differences 
between each of the experimental tasks adopted. Indeed, the current study required observers 
to synchronize their movements with another human agent, which may activate a prior social 
incentive (Miles et al., 2010). Alternatively, Wang and Hamilton required observers to 
generate a motor response following the presentation of a manual gesture (i.e., stimulus-
response paradigm) (see Roberts, Bennett et al., 2016 for further discussion). 
Further evidence that conflicts with the Active-Self account include the lack of 
modulation shown by low self-monitors. Indeed, low self-monitors are typically concerned 
with dispositional cues and tend to prime behaviour through the active-self-concept. Thus, 
they may be described as individuals of expression. If the active-self-concept underlies social 
modulation then it was expected that greater modulation would occur for low self-monitors. 
This thinking was based on findings of low self-monitors being more likely to guide their 
primed response behaviour (e.g., select ‘lucky’ words) according to the observed prime-
construct (e.g., observe a prime mask of ‘7’, which is associated with being lucky) (DeMarree 
et al., 2005; see also Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2008). However, it appears that the 
priming effects reported previously in low self-monitors may be different to those pertaining 
to the mimicry of human actions. In the context of the present study, the low self-monitors 
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were perhaps less sensitive toward the influence of social context, which led to reduced social 
modulation. 
In summary, we found greater motor contagion in high self-monitors following the 
presentation of an anti-social prime compared to a pro-social prime. Moreover, high self-
monitors appeared to inhibit contagion following a pro-social prime. Therefore, high self-
monitors most likely modulated motor contagion through increased sensitivity toward the 
social context, which suggests social modulation is a result of a primed social incentive 
within the observer (STORM account; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). As a result, social 
modulation appears to be underpinned by the impression one tries to form given the social 
context, and not the expression of internal states. Indeed, it appears top-down social processes 
are highly attuned to the precise affects mimicry will have on the observed confederate and 
subsequent social exchange. Further research is required in order to more precisely examine 
this proposal. Finally, it is of interest to examine whether these suggestions extend to the 
observation and copying of non-biological entities such as robots. Following the recent 
findings of increased neural activity (Chaminade et al., 2010; Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & 
Keysers, 2007) and visuomotor priming (Press et al., 2006) during the observation of actions 
and emotions of robots, it is possible that human observers could still prime social incentives 
for the modulation of the copying of non-biological entities.
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Hypothesized effects for the STORM (top panel) and Active-Self (bottom panel) 
accounts of social modulation. Notably, the factor of perspective (1st, 3rd) is featured only in 
the Active-Self account because it upholds no known relevance to the STORM account. Pro-
social and anti-social prime conditions are highlighted by white and grey bars, respectively. 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the experimental procedure. Participants completed a scrambled-
sentence task before undertaking the motor task (or interpersonal observation-execution). The 
scrambled-sentences featured a pro-social or anti-social prime in the first- or third-person 
perspective. The motor task featured the observation of a congruent (horizontal) or 
incongruent (curvilinear) movement. The prime conditions were presented in blocked order 
and the observed movement stimuli were presented in random order. 
 
Figure 3. Standard deviation within the orthogonal axis of movement as a function of 
observed movement stimulus (congruent, incongruent) and self-monitoring (high, low). Pro-
social and anti-social prime conditions are highlighted by white and grey bars, respectively. 
Error bars represent between-subject standard errors.
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Footnotes 
1. We do not suggest self-monitoring is solely categorised by a nominal distribution of 
select individuals, but instead operates on a continuous scale rendering some 
individuals with more/less self-monitoring tendencies (Snyder, 1974; Synder & 
Gangestad, 1986). 
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